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TO SIMULATION OF THE CO2 EMISSION PERMITS MARKET
WITH PURCHASE PRICES
This article describes the problem of the CO2 emission permits market and introduces several
important changes to the standard model, in particular a new goal function, transactions with price
negotiations between regions and - as a consequence of introducing prices for permits – the possibil-
ity of investigating the influence of purchase/sale prices on the market. An additional novelty is the
method of simulating such a market, which is based on a specialized evolutionary algorithm (EA).
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1. Introduction
Long-term observations of climate change indicate that global climate warming is
becoming a real threat for human civilization. Many researchers claim that emission of
CO2 and other greenhouse gases is responsible for this. Thus, great efforts are being
made to reduce these emissions. An accepted method to make this burden lighter is to
implement a system of tradable emission permits. It is commonly claimed that this is
an efficient strategy for achieving environmental goals. Countries
1 participating in an
emission permits system have limitations imposed on their emissions. If the limitations
are too low for some countries, they can do two things. They can buy permits from
other countries, or reduce their emissions by applying new technologies to produce
more of their energy needs without the combustion of fuels. An accepted solution
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should depend on their decisions, based on thorough economic optimization. This
approach to emission reduction has been accepted by many countries of the world
under the Kyoto Protocol.
When investigating the influence of the Kyoto Protocol limitations on the world
economy, researchers build models of such a market and find optimal purchase/sale
strategies for their countries. A market model, enabling the forecasting of the quanti-
ties and prices of traded emissions allowances and the cost of emission reduction for
different countries is clearly needed. One important field is to build a transaction
model and to solve many other problems associated with the credibility of and uncer-
tainty regarding emission level reports, [6], [8], [10], [13].
The model of emission permits trading for CO2 proposed earlier ([7]) does not in-
clude real transaction prices. Although theoretical prices are calculated via the model
(by deriving the cost of emission reduction), they are not practically applicable, except
at the equilibrium point. Actually, the main aim of optimization in this model is to find
the equilibrium point, at which the prices faced by all the countries participating in the
market are equal. The costs of emission reduction, prices and money transfer resulting
from such a configuration fully describe such an ideal market. In the standard model
neither negotiation of prices nor additional transaction costs are considered. The par-
ticipants of this market are assumed to conduct the relevant transactions with the theo-
retical, optimal prices, and thus the optimal solution is given by the equilibrium point
([7]).
The new method, proposed in this paper, does not assume such an ideal market.
Therefore, a more sophisticated, dynamic market model is introduced, to which some
typical elements of a real market are added, such as the possibility of price negotiation
and the influence of real prices on the resulting solutions (similar assumptions can be
found in [3]). It is assumed that the market converges to the equilibrium after a se-
quence of transactions. The number of transactions between the start of the market and
equilibrium is not known in advance. However, each transaction that is profitable for
both parties
2 brings the market toward equilibrium. Thus convergence under the new
model is assured if the considered parameters of the market are proper. Detailed as-
sumptions describing the new market model are given in the next section.
The application of evolutionary algorithms (EAs) in economic simulation models
([3], [5]) has gained considerable attention, mainly due to the fact that economic sys-
tems may be quite easily modeled using this kind of tool. An evolutionary and agent-
based approach to dynamic market modeling can be found in [3] and [11], where this
method is used to simulate the very complicated market of the information sector ([3])
or gas trading ([11]).
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EAs treat members of the population as agents or contract parties, who learn to be-
have almost optimally in their environment and adopt their strategies to get greater
profits, playing their “market-game”. EA is a very good tool for simulating dynamic
or non-stationary market models, where interactions between parties, price negotia-
tions and contracts are repeated during the simulation and can be treated as small steps
that lead the market state toward the global equilibrium point. The optimization prop-
erties of EA assure that the strategies of the trading parties and the equilibrium point
of the market found in simulations are almost optimal.
2. A New market model
Although the Kyoto Protocol imposes severe constraints on the CO2 emissions of
the participating countries, it proposes mechanisms to exceed them. For example, the
participants can buy additional permits from countries that emit less than their limit
and due to this fact, some kind of market for emission permits arises. Thus, countries
that would like to emit more than their assigned limit can do this, upon paying the
selling countries for this opportunity.
For a purchasing country, trading is beneficial only when the price of permits is
lower than the cost of reducing emissions of CO2 by the appropriate level. The country
that wants to offer permits on the market can also decrease its emission levels by more
than it is obliged and sell excess permits (see Fig. 1). Decreasing its emissions by
more than given by the Kyoto target is sometimes beneficial, but selling permits
should bring more money than the costs of emission abatement.
A simple, commonly used Walrasian model
3 of an emissions market is described
by equations (1)–(3). Let us denote the total cost of decreasing emissions in a region (a
country or a source) i down to xi, by Ci(xi) (the abatement cost function). It is assumed
that the cost functions Ci(xi) are positive, decreasing, continuous and differentiable for
each region. The Kyoto limit imposed on region i is denoted Ki . The additional level
of emissions permitted to participant i based on purchasing permits is expressed by si
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E  – minimum total cost of decreasing emissions for all countries in the stan-
dard model;
Ci(xi) – the costs of decreasing emission in i from an initial value F0i down to xi;
si  – the additional level of permits acquired by i;
Ki  – Kyoto target for participant i;
n  – number of participants;
xi  – emission of participant i.
Fig. 1. Cost of emissions reduction for purchasing country i (left): without trade CKi and with trade Ck
(gain Ci-Ck), Ki – Kyoto limit for country i, Xik – emission after trade, Xi0 – initial emission. Cost of
emissions reduction for selling country j (right): emissions reduction without trade is equal to zero
(Xj0 < Ki) and after trade is equal to Cjk (gain Cjk) with emission level Xjk, Kj – Kyoto limit for country j.
The goal is to minimize the costs of reducing emissions to reach the overall
Kyoto target, while fulfilling the needs of participants. However, the optimal value
obtained from this model can be far from the real market optimum due to many in-
accuracies in the parameter values used and simplification of real phenomena. Typi-
cally, many factors influence the prices of goods and the same mechanisms may
play a role in the permits market. In the approach described the most important fac-
tors are, of course, the estimated costs of emissions reduction, but it is possible to
consider different elements. The proposed new model with transactions and negoti-
ated prices is closer to the free market, where countries independently make deci-
sions on buying or selling permits taking into account prices and possible benefits,
than the Walrasian model.
It is assumed in the new model that a transaction is finalized only when the ne-
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higher than the cost for the seller. Otherwise, the transaction is not profitable to at
least one of the participants. It is obvious that each party wants to maximize its
profit.
In the further described evolutionary approach, maximization over s and π is
performed in each transaction by genetic operators, while the total maximization
over x is the overall task of the EA. As mentioned earlier, the model presented con-
tains some important changes in relation to previous ones. The most important
change is a different objective function, (4). This new objective function maximizes
the difference between costs with no trading of permits and costs in the case of
trading plus expenditures for the permits. This takes into account the purchase/sale
price of permits, which considerably influences the profitability of transactions and
the decision to buy/sell permits, i.e. whether it is better to reduce emissions rather
than to buy permits.
Formulae (5)–(9) are constraints ensuring that the market model has realistic prop-
erties:
• a participant cannot emit more than its Kyoto obligation plus acquired permits –
(5),
• additional permits can be bought only from participants in the market, no extra
permits are available – (6),
• the number of units traded in one transaction is limited to smax to avoid large
perturbations of permit prices – (7),
• the sale and the purchase prices are the same – (8),
• the numbers of units traded in a transaction are negative for sellers and positive
for buyers and their absolute values are the same – (9).
The new model is described by the following formulae:
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where:
G  – minimum expenditures of decreasing emissions resulting from trading,
T  – number of transactions of permits conducted,
Cji(xji)  – the costs of decreasing emissions in region i from initial value F0i to
value xji after j transactions,
Ki  – Kyoto target for country i,
n  – number of participants,
xji  – emissions of participant i after j transactions,
sji  – the number of units of emissions acquired by participant i in transaction j,
smax  – the maximum number of units allowed to be traded in one transaction,
πji  – price of permits bought/sold by participant i in transaction j.
Using the objective function (4), it is possible to find the solution which maxi-
mizes the difference between the cost without trade and the cost with trade, in other
words the overall profit from emission trading. According to objective function (1),
the cost of emission reduction, not including the trading of permits, is minimized.
However, the purchasing costs may be considerable in comparison to the cost of CO2
reduction if there were no trade. Also, a different method of setting permit prices is
accepted to prevent the situation in which the price of a permit is zero. The authority,
or rather the participants of a market, must set a minimal price, below which the price
of a permit cannot decrease. According to the model described, the process of nego-
tiations is simulated by generating a random value between the shadow prices of the
contracting parties and it is possible (but with a very small probability) at early stages
of the market’s evolution that zero is selected as the price of a permit in a contract. It
is possible that the shadow price of the selling country is zero when this country re-
ports initial emissions below the Kyoto level (Ki > X 0) – see the right hand side of
Fig. 1. Therefore, its price for one unit of emissions should not be the derivative of the
abatement cost, but the derivative with the minimal value (15). In practical cases, price
negotiations prevent a situation in which the price of permits drops to zero, because no
country would like to sell them for free. Similar situations may also occur in the stan-
dard model, when the needs of the buying countries are less than the surplus of the
selling countries and equilibrium of the market will establish emission levels lower
than the Kioto target (X < Ki) for selling countries. Thus, it seems reasonable that the
models described should have some kind of protection against such cases and impos-
ing a minimal price for permits is one of the possible solutions.
The second important change is the introduction of transactions. Transactions are
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one participant). The number of transactions – T in formula (4) – is not known in ad-
vance, before the simulations. It depends on local agreements between regions and
may be different in simulations with the same market parameters (EA are random al-
gorithms). However, it can be proved that the value T is finite and the model is con-
vergent to the optimal solution with equal shadow prices of buyers and sellers. This
can be derived from the fact that the cost functions are decreasing and monotonic and
only profitable transactions are accepted. In consequence, transactions decrease the
difference between the shadow prices of contracting parties and lead to the optimal
solution with equal prices
4.
The prices of and number of units in a transferred permit are negotiated. Unfortu-
nately, real negotiations are difficult to simulate in a computer program, thus ran-
domly generated numbers from a normal distribution tailored to appropriate price in-
tervals play the role of the uncertainty of negotiations in computer simulations.
It should be noted that the presented market model is dynamic, contrary to the
standard static one and has been prepared specially for application to an agent or evo-
lutionary system. This model emphasizes the process of reaching the equilibrium via
negotiations and transactions. It enables simulation of the behavior of the market and
is capable of finding the equilibrium, contrary to the standard approach which can
only find the equilibrium and prices at that point. The evolutionary method is probably
slower than many typical optimization methods in solving the standard formulation,
but it is difficult to adopt optimization methods to the new model (dynamic program-
ming could probably be an alternative to EA, but this method is also not very fast).
Thus, the evolutionary method is a natural way to perform computer simulations under
the new model. This method is presented in the next section.
3. Evolutionary algorithm method in computer simulations
Evolutionary algorithms are based on the phenomenon of natural evolution. Simi-
larly to nature, they operate on a population of individuals (also agents, members or
solutions), which are reproduced, modified, evaluated and the best are selected over
a sequence of generations. Individuals are encoded solutions of the problem to be
solved. They are modified by evolutionary operators at each step of the algorithm,
emulating random changes (mutation) and recombination of parent genes in the ge-
nome of natural organisms. The best ones are selected as members of the next genera-
tion using some selection method, an equivalent of natural selection, promoting the
best individuals. A standard evolutionary algorithm works in the manner shown in
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Algorithm 1, but this simple scheme requires many problem specific improvements to
work efficiently.
1. Random initialization of the population of solutions.
2. Reproduction and modification of solutions using genetic operators.
3. Evaluation of the solutions obtained.
4. Selection of individuals for the next generation.
5. If a stop condition not satisfied, go to 2.
Algorithm 1. The evolutionary algorithm.
The adaptation of the genetic algorithm to the problem considered requires an ap-
propriate encoding of solutions, definitions of specialized genetic operators for the
problem to be solved, the data structure and the fitness function to be optimized by the
algorithm.
Thus, a specialized evolutionary algorithm is applied to solve the problem. One in-
dividual of the EA population considered here contains information about all the
countries participating in the market, so it is a complete solution of our problem. It is
possible to create as many individuals as necessary (in the simulations about 400) and
obtain the same number of mainly different solutions. Of course, the best one is the
most important, but in some circumstances several of the remaining solutions can also
be used.
Another method may also be applied when each country constitutes a separate
agent [1], [5] and the population of solutions in the evolutionary algorithm corresponds
to the countries participating in trade. However, in the case considered (5 countries and
groups of countries – regions) this population is too small for the evolutionary algo-
rithm to work efficiently, thus it was not used.
Each individual in the EA population codes the actions to be used by each country.
The information needed to describe these actions (or, in other words: to encode a so-
lution to the problem and obtain a population member) is as follows and is encoded as
a vector of 8 floating point numbers
• the theoretical price of a country’s own permits (shadow price),
• the real current price of a permit for sale/purchase,
• the real current value of a permit for sale/purchase,
• current number of units for sale/purchase,
• the net number of units sold/purchased,
• current emissions level,
• previous emissions level (before the present transaction),
• present and previous value of the objective function.
To modify solutions, the following genetic operators were used:
• competition – the country considered offers a number of permits for sale, other
countries offer to buy, the best option is chosen and the solution is modified,Application of an evolutionary algorithm to simulation of the CO2 emission... 101
• bilateral sale – two randomly chosen countries conduct negotiations and if they
agree, the solution is modified.
The prices of and numbers of units covered by traded permits are randomly chosen to
emulate the process of negotiation. The number of units traded is an integer chosen from
the interval {1, ..., 5}
5 and the price of the permit is a value between the purchase offer
and the sale offer with the expected value being the average of these two values.
The fitness function (in the domain of EAs an objective function is called a fitness
function, because it is often somewhat modified – scaled or moved according to the re-
quirements of the EA) for the EA is simply the objective function given by formula (4).
The population initializing procedures and genetic operators are designed so as to
obey constraints (5)–(9) and forbidden solutions cannot appear in the population of solu-
tions.
The use of specialized genetic operators requires the application of some method
of sampling them at each iteration of the algorithm. In the approach used, see [12],
[14], it is assumed that an operator that generates good results should have a large
probability of being applied and thus more frequently affect the population. But it is
very likely that an operator that is good for one individual, gives worse effects for
another, for instance because of its location in the domain of possible solutions.
Thus, every individual may have its own preferences. Every individual solution is
associated with a vector of floating point numbers, besides the encoded solution.
Each number corresponds to a genetic operator. It is a measure of quality of the
genetic operator. The higher the number is, the higher the probability of executing
the operator.
This set of probabilities, or in different words ranking of qualities, is based on the
experience of each individual and according to it, each individual chooses an operator
at each stage of the algorithm. Due to the experience gathered, individuals can maxi-
mize the chances of their offspring surviving.
This method of computing quality factors is based on reinforcement learning [4]
(one of the algorithms used in machine learning). A member of the EA population (an
individual, a solution) is treated as an agent, whose role is to select and call one of the
evolutionary operators
6. When the i-th operator is applied, it can be regarded as an
agent’s action ai leading to a new state si, which, in this case, is a new solution. An
agent receives a reward (also reinforcement value or payoff) or penalty rt depending
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on the quality (the value of the fitness function) of the new state (solution). The aim of
each agent is to perform the actions (the set of actions performed constitutes
a strategy or decision policy, Π), which give the highest long term discounted cumu-
lative reward (or total discounted reinforcement over its lifetime) V
*:
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The following formula can be derived from (11) and (12) and is used for evalua-
tion purposes:
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where:
Π  –  represents the strategy of the agent,
V
Π  – represents the discounted cumulative reward obtained using strategy Π,
E  – represents the expected value,
k  – represents consecutive time steps,
t  – represents the current time,
Vij(st) – is a quality factor or the discounted cumulative reward of the i-th member
of the EA population valued for the j-th genetic operator at moment
(iteration) t,
V
*  – estimated value of the best quality factor (in the experiments the value
obtained using the best operator),
α  – is a learning factor,
γ  – is a discount factor,
ri,j,t+1 – represents the reward obtained when the i-th population member executes
the j-th genetic operator, which is equal to the improvement in the quality
of the solution (the value of the fitness function of this solution) after
execution of the evolutionary operator: r i ,j,t+1 = G i ,j,t+1 – Gi,j,t (G is the
value of the objective (fitness) function, as in formula (4)).
In the experiments presented here the values of α and γ were set to 0.1 and 0.2, re-
spectively.
The selection method applied consists of two methods with different properties:
histogram selection (increases the diversity of the population) and deterministic rou-
lette (strongly promotes the best individuals), [14], which are selected at random dur-
ing the execution of the algorithm. The probability of executing these selection meth-
ods is obtained from formula (13).Application of an evolutionary algorithm to simulation of the CO2 emission... 103
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phis(t + 1), phis(t) – probability of histogram selection in consecutive iterations;
1 – phis(t) – probability of selecting the deterministic roulette method, pdet(t);
Fav(t), Fmin(t), Fmax(t) – average, minimal and maximal values of the fitness func-
tion in the population;
σ(F(t)) – standard deviation of the values of the fitness function in the population
of solutions;
a – a small value for changing the probability phis(t), in simulations a = 0.05.
If the standard deviation of the fitness function in the population (σ(F(t))) is too
small with respect to the extent of this function (max(Fav(t) – Fmin(t), Fmax(t) – Fav(t))),
then it is desirable to increase the probability of the appearance of histogram selection.
In the opposite case, the probability of deterministic roulette selection is increased. If
the parameters of the population are located in some range considered as profitable, it
is beneficial to keep approximately the same probabilities for the appearance of both
methods of selection. It is important that always phis(t) + pdet(t) = 1, i.e. some method
of selection must be executed.
4. Computer simulation results
The computer simulations were conducted on a standard set of participants, as in
[2], [9] and [13]. The following participants are taken into account: USA, EU, Japan,
Canada–Australia–New Zealand (CANZ) and the former Soviet Union (FSU). The
data presented and used are rather approximate. For instance, data for the USA are
considered, although this country has not signed the Kyoto protocol yet. Since it
would be difficult in practice to start the CO2 permit market omitting the country with
the highest CO2 emissions level in the world, the USA were usually considered in
simulations. The results presented in this section also take this country into account to
preserve compatibility with earlier results, but the CO2 permit market has finally
started without the USA. This means that the real prices of permits are lower than
those obtained from various models assuming the presence of the USA, because of the
significantly lower demand from buying countries.J. STAŃCZAK 104
The costs of emissions abatement depend on the value of emission reduction in the
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where:
Ci(x) – cost function for emissions abatement for country i,
a – cost function parameter,
Xi0 – initial emission,
xi – current emission.
The marginal prices are derivatives of the cost function, with a small modification
– the introduction of the value min_p which is the minimal price for permits, prevent-
ing the situation in which permits are sold at price 0, which may occur when the costs
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where:
ci(x) – modified marginal price of emissions permit,
min_p – minimum price of permits,
the remaining symbols have the same meaning as in formula (14).
Table 1 describes the coefficients of the participants’ cost functions, data come
from [2], [9] and [13].











USA 1820.3 0.2755 1251
EU 1038.0 0.9065 860
Japan 350.0 2.4665 258
CANZ 312.7 1.1080 215
FSU 898.6 0.7845 1314
The results obtained using traditional optimization methods (under the assumption
of a perfect market) are presented in Table 2 (see [2]).Application of an evolutionary algorithm to simulation of the CO2 emission... 105
Table 2. Results under the assumption of a perfect permit market






















USA 1561.6 142.5 310.8 44289.0 18433.0 62722.0
EU 959.4 142.5 99.1 14121.75 5602.0 19723.75
Japan 321.1 142.5 63.5 9048.75 2059.0 11107.75
CANZ 248.4 142.5 32.9 4688.25 4583.0 9271.50
FSU 807.8 142.5 –506.3 –72147.75 6473.0 –65674.75
Total 3988.3 – 0 0 37150.0 37150.0
The respective results obtained under the new model are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
The application of an EA to simulation of the permit market gives some additional
benefits, because the result is not only one set of parameters, but a set of possible sce-
narios. The EA operates on a population of different solutions and computations are
conducted in a non-deterministic way. In particular, the negotiation of permit prices is
modeled using random numbers from a modified normal distribution, adapted to the
desired interval (prices are generated from the interval which is profitable to both coun-
tries, if there is no such interval, no transaction is made). Thus the different scenarios
depend mainly on the prices negotiated (i.e. randomly generated in the simulation). This
is also the reason for presentating the results obtained in two tables. Table 3 presents
results from a scenario with high prices, imposed by the sellers (the mean value of the
appropriate normal distribution is situated closer to the buyer’s shadow price), while
Table 4 shows the results for runs with low prices, imposed by the buyers (the mean
value of the appropriate normal distribution is situated closer to the seller’s shadow
price). As one can notice, the differences between them are not very great, except for the
columns “Permit expenditures” and “Permits+reduction cost”. The results presented are
averages for the 10 simulations conducted.
When analyzing the data in Tables 2 (old model), 3 (new model with high prices),
and 4 (new model with low prices), one can observe that after the introduction of per-
mit prices to the trading model, although there is a similar level of permits trade
among countries, permit-related expenditures are quite different. This is not profitable
for the USA, in particular. This conclusion seems to be reasonable, because free mar-
ket prices are a bit higher than in the optimal Walrasian model. The USA buy permits
for the largest amount of emissions (310.8 units in the standard model and 311 units in
the new one, three times more than the second region – EU) and because of this, the
USA’s costs are so high. It is also worth noticing that the expenditure of Japan is very
sensitive to the level of permit prices, but those of CANZ are rather robust. This fact is
probably caused by the shape of their cost curves.J. STAŃCZAK 106
Table 3. Results of simulations using the new model (the column “Final price” denotes
the shadow price at the point where trade finished due to a lack of any further benefits)




















USA 1562.0 142.3 311 50222.9 18381.1 68604.0
EU 959.0 143.2 99 15014.8 5657.5 20672.3
Japan 321.0 143.1 63 14420.0 2074.3 16494.3
CANZ 248.0 143.4 33 1741.7 4638.2 6379.9
FSU 808.0 142.2 –506 –81399.4 6439.5 –74959.8
Total 3898.0 – 0 0 37190.6 37190.6
Table 4. Results of simulations using the new model (the column “Final price” denotes
the shadow price at the point where trade finished due to a lack of any further benefits)




















USA 1562.0 142.3 311 32055.6 18381.1 50436.7
EU 959.0 143.2 99 10593.3 5657.5 16250.8
Japan 321.0 143.1 63 6760.6 2074.3 8834.9
CANZ 248.0 143.4 33 1695.1 4638.2 6333.3
FSU 808.0 142.2 –506 –51104.6 6439.5 –44665.1
Total 3898.0 – 0 0 37190.6 37190.6
It should be noticed that the final equilibrium price for the market is obtained as
a result of small steps – transactions between market participants, not as in the tra-
ditional approach – a result of a global calculation. The results obtained are differ-
ent because the price does not depend only on the shadow price, but also on the
difference between the shadow prices of market participants and also on “ability to
negotiate”, modeled here using a random variable. Thus, there are several local
equilibrium points for any particular trade between regions and the market simula-
tion stops when no profitable transaction can be made, after a number of transac-
tions denoted by T.
5. Conclusions
Generally, the final results presented in this paper are similar to these obtained us-
ing the standard model. Expenditures on permits constitute the only significant differ-Application of an evolutionary algorithm to simulation of the CO2 emission... 107
ence, but these costs are important for regions taking part in the CO2 market, because
they constitute the biggest part of financial means engaged. These differences origi-
nate from the fact that permit costs are calculated using the more realistic assumptions
of the market model applied here.
The main advantage of the new model is its ability to take additional factors into
consideration, for instance the inclusion of prices for emission permits, negotiations
and different models of auctions (in the future) in the ideal market, without the neces-
sity of completely changing the method of solution.
Nowadays, EA are often applied in economic simulations, mainly due to the fact
that economic systems, with many interactions between their elements, may be quite
easily modeled and simulated. The EA-based approach presented in this paper seems
to be a good tool for analyzing economic phenomena ([1], [3], [11], [15]), especially
for dynamic market models with elements of uncertainty (negotiated prices). Static
models can be simulated using easier and probably faster methods, for instance linear
programming. Adapting non-evolutionary methods (for instance dynamic program-
ming) to dynamic models is quite difficult. Thus, evolutionary and agent methods are
becoming more popular.
The introduction of several additional effects, like better models for price negotia-
tions, auctions and uncertainty regarding the level of emissions reported by partici-
pants will be a challenge for further research in this domain.
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Symulacja rynku handlu pozwoleniami na emisję CO2,
z uwzględnieniem cen zakupu, przy użyciu algorytmu ewolucyjnego
Przedstawiono nowe podejście do symulacji rynku pozwoleń na emisję CO2. Pierwsza z prezentowa-
nych w tej pracy nowych koncepcji polega na jawnym wprowadzeniu cen zakupu/sprzedaży do modelu
rynku. Czynnik ten, pomijany w dotychczas stosowanych modelach, może mieć znaczny wpływ na
rynek, a zwłaszcza na podejmowanie decyzji kupna/sprzedaży i – w konsekwencji – także na ilości
sprzedanych pozwoleń. Dlatego też powstał model oparty na bardziej realistycznych założeniach, który
został porównany z modelem tradycyjnym. Zastosowano w nim kilka istotnych modyfikacji, takich jak
zmodyfikowana funkcja celu i transakcje z negocjacjami cen pozwoleń na emisję.
Kolejną innowacją jest zastosowanie algorytmu ewolucyjnego do symulacji rynku. Algorytmy ewolu-
cyjne są obecnie dość często używane nie tylko jako efektywne algorytmy optymalizacyjne, ale stosuje się je
również do symulacji różnego typu systemów ekonomicznych, gier i rynków. Takie zastosowania algoryt-
mów ewolucyjnych znane są pod angielską nazwą Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE).
Słowa kluczowe: rynek pozwoleń na emisję CO2, Protokół z Kioto, algorytm ewolucyjny